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Abstract
In emerging markets, the deviation between the ultimate controlling shareholders’ 
voting rights and their cash flow rights (hereafter “DVC”) in the listed firms 
is quite prevalent. DVC could be introduced due to the ultimate controlling 
shareholders’ opportunistic incentives, as well as by their incentives to improve 
ﬁrm eﬃciency. This study uses 229 listed ﬁrms ultimately controlled by individuals 
or families (hereafter “entrepreneurial firms”) for 2004 in China, to investigate 
the eﬀect of DVC on ﬁrm value and to determine whether it is diﬀerent between 
founder and non-founder controlled firms. We find that DVC has a positive 
eﬀect on ﬁrm value for founder controlled ﬁrms. This result implies that investors 
believe that their interests are better protected by founder controlled ﬁrms than by 
non-founder controlled ﬁrms.
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Introduction
In recent years an increasing number of studies have examined the causes and 
consequences of corporate ownership structure. A seminal paper by La Porta et al 
(1999) ﬁnds that many ﬁrms around the world have a concentrated ownership 
structure and a controlling shareholder, which usually is a family or state agency.
Claessens et al (2000) examined East Asia, Faccio and Lang (2002) and Barca and 
Becht (2001) examined Western Europe, Khanna (2000) examined emerging 
markets, and Morck et al (2000) and Attig et al (2003) examined Canada. 
Collectively they find that the controlling family uses a pyramidal ownership 
structure to control the ﬁrms in the business group. Recent research has examined 
the effect of family control and pyramidal ownership structure on corporate 
governance (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Bae et al, 
2002; Bertrand et al, 2002; Claessens et al, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Anderson et al, 2003; Attig et al, 2003; Lins, 2003; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; 
Villalonga and Armit, 2006). The causes of ownership structure, especially the 
pyramidal structure of family controlled ﬁrms have also been examined (Bertrand 
et al, 2005; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). This research has added new theories 
and evidence about the corporate governance of family controlled firms in 
various countries. The ﬁndings are useful, not only to understand the corporate 
governance characteristics and behavior of family controlled firms, but also for 
evaluating corporate governance eﬃciency. 
Since the founding of the Chinese stock market in the early 1990s, listed 
ﬁrms restructured from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been the majority 
of all listed ﬁrms. As a result, research on corporate governance issues of ﬁrms in 
China has mainly focused on corporate governance issues of state-controlled listed 
firms. There is little research on corporate governance issues of entrepreneurial 
listed ﬁrms.3 However, in recent years, the number of entrepreneurial ﬁrms has 
increased notably as the result of reforms in IPO regulations and the privatization 
of state-controlled listed ﬁrms. By the end of 2004, about a quarter of listed ﬁrms 
were entrepreneurial firms (Kong and Zhang, 2005). Subsequently, corporate 
governance issues of entrepreneurial firms have attracted the attention of 
researchers. Xia and Fang (2005) ﬁnd that compared with the non-state-controlled 
listed ﬁrms, state-controlled listed ﬁrms, especially those controlled by the county 
or city level governments have lower ﬁrm value, especially in regions with weak 
institutional environments. Because the major part of the non-state-controlled 
listed firms are the entrepreneurial listed firms (the remainder are the firms 
3 In this paper, state-controlled firms refer to the firms ultimately controlled by the 
government agencies such as the finance bureau and the state asset supervisory and 
management committee, and entrepreneurial firms refer to the firms ultimately 
controlled by individuals or families.
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controlled by towns and villages), their research implies that entrepreneur control 
is superior to government control.
To address the question of what determines ﬁrm value of entrepreneurial listed 
firms in China, Su and Zhu (2003) use a sample of 128 entrepreneurial listed 
ﬁrms in 2002 to investigate the eﬀect of DVC on ﬁrm value. They ﬁnd that DVC 
has a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value. However, their research can be improved in two 
ways. First, their sample year is before 2004 when listed ﬁrms were not required 
to disclose the ownership chain between their ultimate shareholders and the listed 
ﬁrms. This causes bias in calculating the DVC. Second, they performed univariate 
analysis on the eﬀect of DVC on ﬁrm value but without controlling the eﬀect of 
other variables. Fan et al (2005) ﬁnd that entrepreneurial listed ﬁrms demonstrate 
more layers between their ultimate controlling shareholders and them when the 
ultimate controlling shareholders’ wealth is less. The ﬁnding indicates that setting 
up a pyramidal ownership structure is likely to help the ultimate controlling 
shareholders to mitigate the financial constraint. However, their research does 
not take into account the ultimate shareholders’ opportunistic incentives to set 
up a pyramidal ownership structure4. Since tunneling behaviors are prevalent and 
investor protection is weak in the Chinese stock market, it is insuﬃcient to analyze 
the causes of pyramidal ownership structure from the perspective of financial 
constraint alone.
This research is based on the 229 entrepreneurial listed ﬁrms reported by the 
New Fortune “100 top entrepreneurs and 100 top capitalists” at the end of 2004. 
I investigate the economic consequences of pyramidal ownership structure by 
diﬀerentiating the ﬁrms into founder controlled and non-founder controlled. In 
China’s transitional economy, ﬁrms cannot ﬁnance by debt or equity freely with 
low costs. Since investor protection is weak, a pyramidal ownership structure is 
not only a channel to mitigate ﬁnancial constraint, but also a method of tunneling 
minority shareholders. However, the founders are more likely to care about the 
long term development of their ﬁrms and the image of themselves. The research 
ﬁndings are consistent with this argument. I ﬁnd that DVC does not necessarily 
have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value. The real eﬀect is related to whether the ﬁrms 
are founder controlled or non-founder controlled. DVC is more likely to be a 
tunneling method in non-founder controlled firms than in founder controlled 
ﬁrms.
4 The term “pyramidal ownership structure” refers to a pyramidal-like organization 
structure that at the apex sits a controlling owner who controls a ﬁrm indirectly through 
layers of intermediate companies (La Porta et al, 1999; Claessens et al, 2000; Fan et al, 
2005). The term “tunneling” refers to the expropriation of minority shareholders through 
the transfer of assets and proﬁts of ﬁrms for the beneﬁt of those in control (Johnson et al, 
2000).
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Compared with prior literature, the paper’s main contribution is that it provides 
new evidence on understanding and evaluating the ownership structure and 
corporate governance eﬃciency of entrepreneurial ﬁrms in China. It diﬀerentiates 
entrepreneurial firms into founder controlled and non-founder controlled and 
combines the opportunistic view and the eﬃciency view of ultimate controlling 
shareholders’ setting up the pyramidal ownership structure. The finding that 
investors believe that their interests are more likely to be protected by founder 
controlled firms also provides a useful perspective to examine market factors 
protecting investors in China’s weak legal investor protection environment.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II theoretically analyzes 
the relationship among founder control, ownership structure and ﬁrm value. It 
then develops the hypothesis to be tested. Section III presents the research design, 
including sample selection, data sources, model and variables. Section IV provides 
the empirical results and interpretations of the results. The ﬁnal section concludes.
Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis
The causes of the emergence of a pyramidal ownership structure of 
entrepreneurial listed firms can be explained either by the opportunistic view 
or by the efficiency view. The opportunistic view argues that the ultimate 
shareholders set up a pyramidal structure so as to tunnel the minority 
shareholders. The ultimate shareholders can separate their voting rights from 
cash ﬂow rights through a pyramidal ownership structure so as to eﬀectively 
control firms in the bottom of the pyramid. Under a pyramidal ownership 
structure the ultimate controlling shareholders have large voting rights but small 
cash ﬂow rights. Hence, they have the incentive and ability to tunnel resources 
from the bottom level ﬁrms to the upper level ﬁrms in the pyramid, thereby 
tunneling the minority shareholders. The ultimate controlling shareholders’ 
tunneling incentive and ability are even stronger in an environment of weak 
legal investor protection. This view is supported by Claessens et al (2002) who 
examined 1301 listed ﬁrms in eight economies of East Asia and ﬁnd that ﬁrm 
value increased with the increase of the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash 
flow rights, but decreased with the increase of their voting rights. Bertrand 
et al (2002) examined India, Lins (2003) examined emerging markets and 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) examined East Asian ﬁrms during the ﬁnancial crisis. 
All of these studies ﬁnd similar evidence. With regard to research on Chinese 
listed ﬁrms, Zhou et al (2003), He and Liu (2005), Li et al (2005) also ﬁnd 
evidence of large shareholder tunneling minority shareholders. Collectively, 
these research findings indicate that in the weak legal investor protection 
environment, ultimate controlling shareholders have an incentive and an ability 
to tunnel the minority shareholders. Furthermore, the pyramidal ownership 
structure separates the ultimate controlling shareholders’ voting rights from 
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cash ﬂow rights and exacerbates the tunneling eﬀect.5
The eﬃciency view argues that the pyramidal ownership structure can be used 
by the ultimate controlling shareholders to mitigate external ﬁnancing diﬃculties, 
to establish an internal capital market, and to increase ﬁrm size and withstand risks 
so as to enhance ﬁrm value. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) show that through a 
pyramidal ownership structure, the ultimate controlling shareholders can use all 
the retained proﬁts of the ﬁrms within the business group. Therefore, they have 
incentives to set up a pyramidal ownership structure when the cost of external 
ﬁnancing is high. Because the cost of external ﬁnancing vis-à-vis internal ﬁnancing 
is normally higher in a weak investor protection environment, the ultimate 
controlling shareholders’ incentive to set up a pyramidal ownership structure 
is even stronger. Fan et al (2005) argue that when the ultimate controlling 
shareholders’ wealth is less, they would face a tighter ﬁnancing constraint. Their 
incentive would be stronger here to set up a pyramidal ownership structure. Fan et 
al (2005)’ research reveals that more layers exist between the ultimate controlling 
shareholders and the listed ﬁrms when the former owns less wealth. The result 
supports the view that a pyramidal ownership structure can be used by the 
ultimate controlling shareholders to mitigate ﬁnancing constraints. In addition, 
the setting up of a pyramidal ownership structure also helps to increase ﬁrm size 
by realizing scale economies and improving the ultimate control of shareholders’ 
political inﬂuence (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Morck et al, 2005). This is 
extremely important for the entrepreneurial ﬁrms facing political discrimination 
and government regulations in China’s transitional economic environment. 
Taken together, the opportunistic view and the eﬃciency view on the causes 
of pyramidal ownership structure are both supported by theory and evidence. 
This research is concerned with whether ultimate controlling shareholders who 
are the founders or not determines the incentive (opportunistic or efficiency 
improving) to set up a pyramidal ownership structure. Here, the ultimate 
controlling shareholders refer to the current controlling shareholders who are the 
founders of the listed firms or their preexistences, while the non-founders are 
5 A point against the opportunistic view is that if the controlling shareholders’ tunneling 
behaviors are prevalent, why then would the minority shareholders seek to invest in these 
firms? Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) propose three explanatory reasons. First, in 
some countries, information disclosure quality is quite low, so the minority shareholders 
may not be able to discover the controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior. Second, 
the pyramidal ownership structure may be useful to enhance firm value due to scale 
economies and more political connections, thereby counteracting the negative effect 
of the controlling shareholders’ tunneling behaviors on ﬁrm value. Third, the minority 
shareholders may have no other choice, eg, when the pyramidal ownership structure 
emerges due to mergers and acquisitions, the original minority shareholders cannot 
exit without bearing the loss of price falls even though they can successfully expect the 
tunneling behavior of the new controlling shareholders.
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6 The ultimate controlling shareholders being the non-founders results from the cases 
that individuals or families acquire the controlling ownership of the listed ﬁrms or their 
preexistence (entrepreneurial ﬁrms or state-controlled ﬁrms) that were not founded by 
them and become the ultimate controlling shareholders of the listed ﬁrms.
7 I ﬁnd that in the sample ﬁrms, the age of the founder is signiﬁcantly (both statistically 
and economically) larger than that of non-founder. Because the older is more likely the 
younger to be risk-averse and to have got reputation and the opportunistic behavior 
has the characteristics of high risk, high return and short-term, the difference in age 
between founder and non-founder is consistent with the diﬀerence in their opportunistic 
incentives.
current controlling shareholders who are neither the founders of the listed ﬁrms 
nor of their preexistences.6 I expect that diﬀerence in controlling shareholders to 
aﬀect their incentives and behavior. As for the eﬃciency improving incentive, in 
China’s transitional economy, due to underdevelopment of ﬁnancial markets, it is 
diﬃcult for the entrepreneurial ﬁrms to ﬁnance from the banks or stock market. 
The founder and non-founder controlled firms both face financial constraints. 
However, as for the opportunistic incentive, founders are usually more likely to 
focus on the businesses founded by themselves, to care about the development and 
the reputation of their ﬁrms and families (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson 
et al, 2003; Wang, 2005). Hence, the founders’ incentive to set up a pyramidal 
ownership structure so as to tunnel the minority shareholders is weaker than that 
for non-founders.7 Based on this discussion, the hypothesis is developed:
Hypothesis: The negative (positive) eﬀect of DVC on ﬁrm value is smaller 
(larger) in founder controlled entrepreneurial listed ﬁrms than in non-founder 
controlled entrepreneurial listed ﬁrms.
Research Design
1. Sample Selection and Data Sources
Kong and Zhang (2005) report in the New Fortune that by the end of 2004 there 
were 335 non-state-controlled listed firms in China’s stock market. I selected 
236 listed ﬁrms controlled by the New Fortune “top 100 entrepreneurs and top 
100 capitalists” at the end of 2004 as the original sample. Six ﬁrms are excluded 
because they disclosed no information on cash flow rights, and one firm is 
excluded because it was in the ﬁnance and insurance industry. The ﬁnal sample 
of 229 firms represents about two thirds of all non-state-controlled firms and 
comprises a representative sample. These sample firms represent the relatively 
larger ﬁrms in the 335 non-state-controlled listed ﬁrms. In the 229 sample ﬁrms, 
the number of the founder and non-founder controlled firms are 81 and 148, 
respectively. 
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The diﬀerentiation between founder and non-founder is determined by whether 
the current ultimate controlling shareholders are the founders of the listed 
firm or their preexistences. These are differentiated according to disclosures 
about ultimate controlling shareholders in annual reports, and the ﬁrm history 
information in the IPO prospectus or listing announcements of listed firms. 
Data on ﬁnancial variables, stock price, the ratio of tradable shares and industry 
category are from CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting Research) 
Database. The data on the marketization index of each region is taken from 
the 2000 index constructed by Fan et al (2003). Voting rights, cash ﬂow rights, 
and the wealth of the ultimate controlling shareholders are extracted directly 
from the statistics of the New Fortune. To confirm data accuracy, data were 
cross checked on voting rights and cash ﬂow rights with data in CCER (China 
Center for Economic Research) Database. Differences revealed between these 
two databases were reconciled from information obtained directly from the 
annual reports of listed firms. This process produced 229 sample firms where 
voting rights refer to the sum of the smallest percentage of ownership in each 
chain between the ultimate controlling shareholders and the listed firms. Cash 
ﬂow rights refer to the product of percentage of ownership in each chain between 
the ultimate controlling shareholders and the listed firms. For example, if the 
ultimate controlling shareholder A owns 20% and 30% ownership of company 
B and company C, respectively, and company B and company C own 10% and 
20% ownership of D respectively, then A, the ultimate controlling shareholder, 
has voting rights and cash ﬂow rights in company D of 30% (10%+20%) and 
8% (20%*10%+30%*20%) respectively. This calculation method is consistent 
with that of Claessens et al (2000). In addition, in the sample ﬁrms, the ultimate 
controlling shareholders refer to the shareholders (individuals or families) that own 
the most voting rights and not less than 10% of the listed ﬁrms’ voting rights. 
When the voting rights of diﬀerent largest shareholders (individuals or families) 
differ at 10% or less than 10%, these largest shareholders usually have a close 
relationship with each other, so in this case, the ultimate controlling shareholders 
refer to these largest shareholders collectively. In the sample ﬁrms, less than 20 
ﬁrms fall into this case with little expected impact on results.
2. Model and Variables
I employ the following OLS regression model to test the hypothesis:
Tobin Q = ß0 + ß1*Founder + ß2*DVC + ß3*Founder*DVC + ß4*CTLR +  
 ß5*Wealth + ß6*SIZE + ß7*Regulat + ß8*ROA + ß9*DR + ß10*TrdR +  
 ß11*Index + e
Where, ß0 is the intercept, ß1~ß11 are regression coeﬃcients and e is the residual 
term. The speciﬁcations of the variables are as follows.
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(1) Dependent Variable
Tobin Q represents ﬁrm value, ie, the ratio of ﬁrm’s year-end market value over 
its current acquisition value. Obtaining current acquisition value is difficult 
and hence book value is used as a proxy. Market value is the sum of the market 
value of the firm’s liabilities, which includes short-term liabilities and long-
term liabilities, and the market value of equity. Because listed ﬁrms in China 
have tradable and non-tradable shares, the market value of equity is the sum of 
the market value of tradable shares and non-tradable shares. However, because 
there is no market price for non-tradable shares and the non-tradable shares 
are usually transferred based on net assets per share, the market value of non-
tradable shares was calculated as the product of the number of shares and net 
assets per share. Firm value is then calculated as: Tobin Q=ﬁrm’s market value/
current acquisition value=(stock price*number of tradable shares+net assets per 
share*number of non-tradable shares+book value of liability)/total book assets. 
All values in the formula are year end values. This method of calculating Tobin 
Q is consistent with that used by Su and Zhu (2003) and Xia and Fang (2005) 
for the China’s listed ﬁrms. I denote the Tobin Q calculated by this method as 
Q1.
To mitigate the bias of calculating Tobin Q using net assets as the proxy of 
market value of non-tradable shares, the market value per share of non-tradable 
shares is calculated by 20%, 30% or 40% of stock price, and Tobin Q is denoted 
thereby as Q2, Q3 and Q4 respectively. Bai et al (2004) adopt the method of 
calculating the market value of non-tradable shares by 20% and 30% of the stock 
price so as to calculate Tobin Q of China’s listed ﬁrms. I followed their method 
here and take into account the method of calculating the market value of non-
tradable shares by 40% of stock price as well so as to improve the robustness of the 
results.
(2) Testing Variables
Founder is a dummy variable. Its value is 1 when the ultimate controlling 
shareholders are the founder of the listed ﬁrms or their preexistences, and 0 
otherwise. DVC is the deviation of the ultimate controlling shareholders’ voting 
rights from their cash ﬂow rights in the listed ﬁrms, ie, the ratio of voting rights 
over cash ﬂow rights. For the calculation of voting rights and cash ﬂow rights, 
refer to the subsection “Sample selection and data sources”. Founder*DVC is 
the interaction term of Founder and DVC. The hypothesis predicts that this 
interaction term should be positively correlated with the dependent variable.
(3) Control Variables
CTLR is the ultimate controlling shareholders’ voting rights in the listed ﬁrms. 
Refer to the subsection “Sample selection and data sources” for its calculation. This 
variable is included because the larger the ultimate controlling shareholders’ voting 
rights, the more ability they possess to tunnel the minority shareholders, this eﬀect 
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not being fully captured by the DVC variable.
Wealth is the natural logarithm of the wealth of the ultimate controlling 
shareholders. This variable is included because the more wealth possessed by the 
ultimate controlling shareholders, the higher can be expected regarding their 
managerial ability. Here, they would provide more support to the listed ﬁrms, to 
enhance reputation and be less concerned with tunneling minority shareholders. 
All of these aspects are likely to improve ﬁrm value.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of year-end total assets. Regulat is a dummy 
variable indicating the ﬁrm in regulated industry (value is 1) or not (value is 0). 
The following industries are classiﬁed as regulated based on the CSRC’s industry 
category guide: Mining (B), Petroleum, Chemical and Plastics (C4), Metal and 
nonmetal (C6), Electric Power, Gas and Water Production and Supply (D), 
Transportation and Storage (F), and Information Technology (G).
Additionally, ROA, DR, TrdR and Index are included as control variables. 
ROA is the ratio of net income over total assets, DR is the ratio of total liability 
over total assets, and TrdR is the ratio of year-end number of tradable shares over 
that of non-tradable shares. These variables are used to control the eﬀect of ﬁrm 
operation eﬃciency, liability ratio and tradable shares ratio on ﬁrm value. Index 
is the marketization index of the province level region in which the ﬁrm registers. 
This variable is to control the eﬀect of a regional institutional environment on 
ﬁrm value. Data on this variable are from the 2000 index reported by Fan et al. 
(2003).
(4) Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all variables in the regression model, and 
Panels A, B and C report the results on the total sample, founder controlled ﬁrms 
and non-founder controlled ﬁrms, respectively. Panel A shows that for 229 sample 
ﬁrms, the mean of Q1 is 1.22, with minimum and maximum values of 0.59 and 
4.01, respectively. Consistent with expectations, the mean of Q2 is smaller than 
that of Q3 and the mean of Q3 is smaller than that of Q4. The mean of DVC is 
2.43, with the minimum and the maximum values 1.00 and 26.15, respectively, 
indicating that on average, voting rights are twice those of cash ﬂow rights, the 
smallest DVC is no deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights, and 
the biggest DVC is 26.15. The mean of CTLR is 38%, and its minimum and 
maximum values are 10% and 75%, respectively, suggesting that the ultimate 
controlling shareholders have relatively large voting rights.
Panel B and Panel C show that the mean and median values of Q1 of the 
founder controlled firms are 1.19 and 1.15 respectively; those of the non-
founder controlled ﬁrms are 1.23 and 1.13 respectively, thereby indicating that 
the two types of ﬁrms do not have obvious diﬀerence in ﬁrm values. However, 
the mean and median values of Q2, Q3 and Q4 of founder controlled ﬁrms are 
all slightly smaller than those of non-founder controlled firms. The mean and 
median values of DVC in non-founder controlled firms are both larger than 
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those in founder controlled ﬁrms, and the mean and median values of CTLR in 
non-founder controlled ﬁrms are both smaller than those in founder controlled 
firms.8 In addition, there are some differences between founder controlled firms 
and non-founder controlled ﬁrms in ultimate controlling shareholders’ wealth, ﬁrm 
size, regulated industry category, operation efficiency, liability ratio and regional 
institutions index.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables N Mean S.D Min 25% Median 75% Max
Panel A: Total sample
Q1 229 1.22 0.35 0.59 1.05 1.14 1.27 4.01 
Q2 229 1.10 0.50 0.36 0.88 0.99 1.16 5.86 
Q3 229 1.18 0.56 0.41 0.93 1.05 1.26 6.66 
Q4 229 1.26 0.62 0.46 0.96 1.10 1.37 7.46 
Founder 229 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
DVC 229 2.43 2.55 1.00 1.11 1.67 2.81 26.15 
CTLR 229 0.38 0.15 0.09 0.28 0.30 0.49 0.75 
Wealth 229 18.87 0.99 15.89 18.27 18.92 19.40 21.40 
SIZE 229 21.01 0.77 18.56 20.54 21.00 21.51 23.15 
Regulat 229 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
ROA 229 0.01 0.09 -0.68 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.20 
DR 229 0.53 0.23 0.08 0.41 0.52 0.64 2.34 
TrdR 229 0.37 0.12 0.06 0.29 0.35 0.43 1.00 
Index 229 6.61 1.49 3.15 5.61 6.41 8.10 8.41 
Panel B: Founder controlled ﬁrms
Q1 81 1.19 0.25 0.59 1.05 1.15 1.28 2.20 
Q2 81 1.02 0.32 0.36 0.85 0.93 1.10 2.57 
Q3 81 1.11 0.38 0.41 0.92 1.00 1.18 2.87 
Q4 81 1.20 0.43 0.46 0.96 1.07 1.29 3.17 
DVC 81 1.76 1.29 1.00 1.01 1.25 1.95 9.59 
CTLR 81 0.47 0.15 0.18 0.34 0.45 0.59 0.75 
8 The maximum value of DVC in non-founder controlled firms is 26.15, which is 
much larger than its 75 percentile value, indicating that DVC is likely to have outliers. 
However, the 25 percentile value, median and 75 percentile value of DVC in non-
founder controlled ﬁrms are all larger than those in founder controlled ﬁrms, indicating 
that the larger DVC in non-founder controlled firms relative to that in founder 
controlled ﬁrms is not due to outliers. The eﬀect of outliers on DVC is further discussed 
in the subsection “Robustness checks”.
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Variables N Mean S.D Min 25% Median 75% Max
Wealth 81 19.25 0.85 17.18 18.83 19.23 19.62 21.40 
SIZE 81 20.96 0.74 19.66 20.33 20.87 21.51 22.66 
Regulat 81 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
ROA 81 0.04 0.06 -0.32 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.13 
DR 81 0.42 0.19 0.08 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.93 
TrdR 81 0.33 0.09 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.38 0.70 
Index 81 7.01 1.53 3.15 5.70 7.90 8.32 8.41 
Panel C: Non-founder controlled ﬁrms
Q1 148 1.23 0.39 0.86 1.04 1.13 1.27 4.01 
Q2 148 1.15 0.57 0.53 0.89 1.02 1.22 5.86 
Empirical Results and Interpretations
1. Univariate Analysis
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients among variables. It shows that 
the correlation coeﬃcients among Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 all exceed 0.90, suggesting 
that the methods of calculating the market value of tradable shares has little aﬀect 
on the calculation of Tobin’s Q. Founder is negatively correlated with Q1, Q3 
and Q4, but the correlation coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant, however, it is negatively 
correlated with Q2 and the correlation coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level, 
indicating that there is not much difference in Tobin Q between founder and 
non-founder controlled firms. DVC is positively correlated with Q1, Q2, Q3 
and Q4, but the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant, suggesting that DVC does not 
necessarily harm ﬁrm value, and its eﬀect on ﬁrm value is likely to be related to 
specific conditions. Founder is negatively correlated with DVC, and positively 
correlated with CTLR, the coeﬃcients of both signiﬁcant at 0.01 level, indicating 
that founders have more voting rights in the listed ﬁrms and less DVC than non-
founders. The column of Founder in Table 2 shows that in the founder controlled 
ﬁrms, the ultimate controlling shareholders’ wealth is higher, operation eﬃciency 
is higher, liability ratio is lower, the ratio of tradable shares is lower and the degree 
of marketization of the region where the ﬁrm locates is higher than counterpart 
ﬁrms that are non-founder controlled. Since the univariate analysis shows only the 
relationship between two variables, I use a multivariate regression to further test 
the hypothesis.
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Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcients
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Founder DVC CTLR Wealth SIZE Regulat ROA DR TrdR
Q2 0.965 1.000 
0.000 
Q3 0.969 0.997 1.000 
0.000 0.000 
Q4 0.967 0.990 0.998 1.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Founder -0.060 -0.127 -0.095 -0.070 1.000 
0.363 0.056 0.150 0.290 
DVC 0.063 0.087 0.069 0.053 -0.197 1.000 
0.343 0.188 0.302 0.423 0.003 
CTRL -0.063 -0.127 -0.097 -0.074 0.461 -0.260 1.000 
0.345 0.055 0.142 0.268 0.000 0.000 
Wealth 0.004 -0.035 -0.015 0.002 0.287 -0.512 0.454 1.000 
0.951 0.599 0.825 0.982 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE -0.474 -0.411 -0.440 -0.461 -0.050 0.013 -0.115 0.271 1.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.453 0.844 0.084 0.000 
Regulat 0.032 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.052 0.026 0.046 0.071 0.027 1.000 
0.635 0.717 0.680 0.652 0.437 0.697 0.487 0.283 0.689 
ROA 0.087 -0.008 0.023 0.047 0.199 -0.074 0.145 0.219 0.002 -0.068 1.000 
0.190 0.907 0.733 0.481 0.003 0.267 0.028 0.001 0.976 0.307 
DR 0.134 0.340 0.289 0.246 -0.340 0.176 -0.245 -0.180 0.186 0.003 -0.472 1.000 
0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.964 0.000 
TrdR -0.022 0.003 -0.049 -0.091 -0.244 0.180 -0.391 -0.240 0.277 0.021 -0.130 0.122 1.000 
0.745 0.965 0.458 0.171 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.748 0.050 0.065 
Index 0.024 -0.004 0.015 0.030 0.197 -0.169 0.181 0.182 0.010 0.034 0.153 -0.140 -0.177 
0.719 0.952 0.824 0.656 0.003 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.879 0.614 0.020 0.034 0.007 
Note: The number of observations is 229. Each variable has two rows of values, with the upper row 
presenting Pearson coeﬃcients and the lower row presenting P values.
2. Multivariate Regression Analysis
(1) Total Sample Analysis
Table 4 reports the regression results about the relation among founder control, 
ownership structure and firm value, with four sets of results corresponding to 
dependent variables Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 respectively. In all results, DVC and 
Founder*DVC are both significantly positively correlated with the dependent 
variables, indicating that DVC is not necessarily harmful to ﬁrm value. In contrast, 
DVC is likely to enhance ﬁrm value, especially for the founder controlled ﬁrms. This 
is because in an emerging market, the ultimate controlling shareholders’ incentive to 
form an internal capital market is likely to be stronger than their incentives to tunnel 
the minority shareholders. This is especially the case when the ultimately controlling 
shareholders are the founders. The above results support the hypothesis. 
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With regard to the control variables, in the four sets of results, CTLR is 
significantly negatively correlated with the dependent variable. This outcome 
suggests that voting rights have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value because investors 
believe that the greater the voting rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders’, 
the stronger their ability to tunnel the minority shareholders. Wealth is 
significantly positively correlated with the dependent variable, indicating that 
the ultimate controlling shareholders’ wealth has a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm value. 
SIZE is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with the dependent variable, suggesting 
that firm value decreases with the increase of firm size. This is consistent with 
Xia and Fang (2005) and might be explained by a lower propensity for growth 
opportunities experienced by large ﬁrms. ROA is signiﬁcantly positively correlated 
with the dependent variable, indicating that better performing ﬁrms have higher 
ﬁrm values. DR is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the dependent variable, a 
result that is likely due to debt holders constraining ﬁrms’ opportunistic behaviors. 
TrdR is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the dependent variable. This result 
is likely due to the monitoring role of tradable shareholders over non-tradable 
large shareholders. It may be due too to the method of calculating Tobin Q when 
there are non-tradable shares. For example, the market value of non-tradable 
shares is calculated based on net assets, or 20%, 30% or 40% of stock price, while 
the market value of tradable shares is calculated directly from stock prices, hence 
the ﬁrm value of the ﬁrms with high tradable shares ratio may be overestimated. 
Regulate and Index does not have a signiﬁcant association with TobinQ, indicating 
that industry regulation and regional environment do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect 
on ﬁrm value. This result regarding regional environment is consistent with that of 
Xia and Fang (2005) for non-state-controlled ﬁrms. 






Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
 Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value
Intercept ? 4.991 8.95 *** 6.064 8.08 *** 7.008 8.19 *** 7.951 8.26 ***
Founder + -0.076 -1.18 -0.096 -1.11 -0.105 -1.07 -0.115 -1.03 
DVC ? 0.019 2.28 ** 0.024 2.05 ** 0.026 1.99 ** 0.028 1.93 *
Founder* 
DVC
+ 0.044 1.76 * 0.061 1.84 * 0.071 1.87 * 0.081 1.89 *
CTLR - -0.403 -2.65 *** -0.634 -3.09 *** -0.727 -3.11 *** -0.820 -3.12 ***
Wealth + 0.148 5.82 *** 0.200 5.86 *** 0.227 5.83 *** 0.254 5.80 ***
SIZE - -0.336 -12.27 *** -0.458 -12.43 *** -0.523 -12.45 *** -0.588 -12.45 ***
Regulat + 0.027 0.70 0.032 0.61 0.042 0.70 0.051 0.77 
ROA + 0.931 3.85 *** 1.343 4.12 *** 1.540 4.14 *** 1.737 4.16 ***
DR + 0.557 5.90 *** 1.236 9.72 *** 1.292 8.91 *** 1.348 8.27 ***
TrdR + 0.518 3.14 *** 0.681 3.07 *** 0.577 2.28 ** 0.473 1.66 *






Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
 Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value
N 229 229 229 229
F value 15.65 20.20 19.11 18.48
Adj-R2 0.41 0.48 0.47 0.46
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two tailed).
(2) Separate Analysis on Founder and Non-founder Controlled Firms
I next analyze the founder and non-founder controlled ﬁrms separately so as to 
investigate the eﬀect of DVC on ﬁrm value in these two types of ﬁrms. Table 4 
and Table 5 report the results on these two types of ﬁrms, respectively. Table 4 
shows that in the four sets of results with Q1 to Q4 as dependent variables, DVC 
is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the dependent variable, indicating that 
DVC has a positive eﬀect instead of a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value in founder 
controlled ﬁrms. This result is likely to be because in founder controlled ﬁrms, 
the efficiency improvement effect of DVC exceeds its tunneling effect on firm 
value. Table 5 shows that in four sets of results DVC is positively correlated with 
the dependent variable, but the correlation is insignificant, indicating that in 
non-founder controlled firms, DVC does not have a significant effect on firm 
value. This is likely to be because in non-founder controlled ﬁrms, the eﬃciency 
improvement eﬀect of DVC is counteracted by its tunneling eﬀect on ﬁrm value. 
The results of Table 4 and Table 5 together suggest that DVC is more likely to have 
a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm value in founder controlled ﬁrms than in non-founder 
controlled ﬁrms, further supporting the hypothesis.
In addition, the results on control variables of Table 4 and Table 5 are similar 
to those of Table 3 with the exception that in Table 4, ROA does not have a 
significant relation with the dependent variable, a result possibly due to firm 
value being related more to factors other than accounting performance in founder 
controlled ﬁrms.





Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
 Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value
Intercept ? 3.045 4.10 *** 2.918 3.13 *** 3.373 3.12 *** 3.827 3.11 ***
DVC ? 0.086 4.47 *** 0.118 4.89 *** 0.138 4.93 *** 0.158 4.96 ***
CTLR - -0.593 -3.19 *** -0.963 -4.14 *** -1.119 -4.15 *** -1.274 -4.15 ***
Wealth + 0.271 5.95 *** 0.386 6.76 *** 0.449 6.79 *** 0.512 6.81 ***
SIZE - -0.354 -7.55 *** -0.470 -8.00 *** -0.544 -8.00 *** -0.618 -7.98 ***
Regulat + 0.031 0.70 0.013 0.23 0.017 0.27 0.021 0.29 
ROA + 0.071 0.16 -0.007 -0.01 0.005 0.01 0.017 0.02 
DR + 0.411 2.92 *** 0.921 5.22 *** 0.914 4.47 *** 0.907 3.90 ***
TrdR + 0.530 1.80 * 0.788 2.13 ** 0.748 1.75 * 0.709 1.46 
Index + 0.015 0.99 0.015 0.81 0.018 0.84 0.021 0.87 
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
 Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value
N 81 81 81 81
F value 8.84 9.79 9.96 10.26
Adj-R2 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.51
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two tailed).






Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
 Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value  Coeﬀ. T value
Intercept ? 5.804 7.60 *** 7.355 7.14 *** 8.482 7.26 *** 9.608 7.34 ***
DVC ? 0.012 1.19 0.013 0.93 0.013 0.85 0.014 0.78 
CTLR - -0.514 -2.30 ** -0.763 -2.53 ** -0.878 -2.56 ** -0.993 -2.59 **
Wealth + 0.110 3.40 *** 0.142 3.25 *** 0.158 3.19 *** 0.174 3.13 ***
SIZE - -0.343 -9.71 *** -0.474 -9.93 *** -0.539 -9.96 *** -0.604 -9.96 ***
Regulat + 0.033 0.59 0.061 0.81 0.076 0.90 0.092 0.96 
ROA + 1.067 3.57 *** 1.585 3.93 *** 1.816 3.97 *** 2.046 3.99 ***
DR + 0.598 4.89 *** 1.319 7.99 *** 1.395 7.45 *** 1.470 7.01 ***
TrdR + 0.554 2.71 *** 0.707 2.56 ** 0.597 1.91 * 0.487 1.39 
Index + 0.023 1.31 0.038 1.60 0.046 1.68 * 0.053 1.73 *
N 148 148 148 148
F value 12.67 16.98 16.28 15.82
Adj-R2 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.48
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two tailed).
(3) Additional Analysis
The above analysis indicates that in founder controlled firms, the ultimate 
controlling shareholders’ incentive is weak to set up a pyramidal ownership 
structure in order to tunnel minority shareholders. To provide additional 
evidence, I further examine the relation between founder control and the largest 
shareholders’ behavior. Jiang et al (2006) ﬁnd that occupying assets of listed ﬁrms 
is an important way for the largest shareholders to tunnel minority shareholders. 
Using their approach, I adopt the ratio of year-end balance of “other accounts 
receivables” over total assets as the proxy of the degree of the largest shareholders’ 
asset occupying behavior. This is denoted as Tunnel Proxy. Table 6 provides the 
eﬀect of founder control and DVC on Tunnel Proxy, with the control variables the 
same as those in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 6 shows that Founder is signiﬁcantly 
negatively correlated with Tunnel Proxy, while DVC does not have a signiﬁcant 
relationship with Tunnel Proxy. The results indicate that founders are less likely 
to tunnel minority shareholders through asset occupying behavior than non-
founders, and DVC does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the largest shareholders’ 
asset occupying behavior. These results further suggest that founders have weaker 
incentives to tunnel minority shareholders than do non-founders, and a pyramidal 
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ownership structure may not result from the tunneling incentive of the ultimate 
controlling shareholders.
Table 6: Founder Control and Asset Occupying Behavior
Independent 
variables
Predicted sign Dependent variable: Tunnel Proxy
Coeﬀ. T value
Intercept ? 0.446 2.68 ***
Founder - -0.039 -2.96 ***
DVC + -0.002 -0.86 
CTLR + 0.020 0.43 
Wealth - -0.010 -1.26 
SIZE + -0.009 -1.07 
Regulat ? 0.023 1.96 *
ROA - -0.505 -6.96 ***
DR - -0.015 -0.53 
TrdR 0.058 1.18 




Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two tailed).
(4) Robustness Checks
The main results of this study have two alternative explanations, ie, the 
diversification difference explanation and the acquisition explanation. First, 
founder controlled firms are likely to be more specialized (ie, they focus on 
particular industries) and more likely to obtain listing directly. In contrast, 
non-founder controlled firms are likely to be more diversified (ie, engaged in 
various industries) and more likely to be listed through the ultimate controlling 
shareholders’ acquisition of some listed ﬁrms’ controlling shares. As a result, the 
ﬁrm value diﬀerence between founder and non-founder controlled ﬁrms is likely 
to be caused by the difference in their degree of diversification or method of 
obtaining listing status. However, I argue that these alternative explanations are 
not of much importance because in China’s emerging market and transitional 
economy, diversification may not harm firm value. Prior literature on Chinese 
firms also does not find evidence of a negative effect of diversification on firm 
value. The results of Table 3 to Table 5 show that DVC is more likely to have a 
positive effect on firm value in founder controlled firms than in non-founder 
controlled firms. The diversification difference explanation and the acquisition 
explanation do not easily explain why the founder’s eﬀect on ﬁrm value is related 
to DVC. Therefore, the results of this study are more likely to be explained by 
the combination of the opportunistic view and the eﬃciency view of the causes of 
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pyramidal ownership structure. In addition, to examine the eﬀect of outliers on 
the results, I exclude the observations beyond the three or ﬁve standard deviations 
on each variable mean, and redo the analyses in Table 3 to Table 5. The main 
results are unchanged.
Conclusions
Despite an increasing interest in corporate governance issues of family ﬁrms or 
entrepreneurial firms, little research has been undertaken on those of China’s 
family ﬁrms or entrepreneurial ﬁrms. This study selects the 229 entrepreneurial 
listed firms reported by the New Fortune “top 100 entrepreneurs and top 100 
capitalists” for 2004 as the research sample, and investigates the relation among 
founder control, ownership structure and firm value. I find that DVC is more 
likely to have a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm value in founder controlled ﬁrms than in 
non-founder controlled ﬁrms. The result indicates that investors tend to believe 
that their interests are more likely to be protected by founder controlled ﬁrms.
The study contributes to the literature by providing new evidence to help 
us understand and evaluate the ownership structure and corporate governance 
efficiency of entrepreneurial firms in China. This is achieved by differentiating 
entrepreneurial firms into founder controlled and non-founder controlled, and 
by combining the opportunistic view and the efficiency view in explaining the 
ultimate controlling shareholders’ purpose in establishing the pyramidal ownership 
structure. Moreover, the ﬁndings of this study also provide a useful attempt to 
identify the market forces protecting investors in China’s weak legal investor 
protection environment.
The reader is reminded that, although this study investigates the diﬀerence in 
incentives and behavior of setting up a pyramidal ownership structure between 
founder and non-founder controlled firms, it is not designed to study factors 
which aﬀect a founder’s decision to control a ﬁrm. Information about this question 
would be useful to our understanding about corporate governance characteristics 
and behavior of entrepreneurial ﬁrms. Finally, this paper does not examine the 
eﬀect of the degree of family involvement in corporate governance on ﬁrm value. 
These issues can be the focus of further research.
References
1. He, J.G., and Liu, F., 2005, “Large shareholder control, tunneling and investor 
protection: Evidence from related party transactions in listed ﬁrms’ acquisitions”, China 
Accounting and Finance Review, 3. (in Chinese)
2. Fan, G., Wang, X.L., and Zhu, H.P., 2003, The Report on the Relative Process of 
Marketization of Each Region in China. The Economic Science Press. (in Chinese)
LIJUN XIA48
3. Li, Z.Q., Yu, Q., and Wang, X.K., 2005, “Tunneling, propping and acquisitions: 
Evidence from China’s listed ﬁrms”, The Economic Research Journal, 1. (in Chinese)
4. Kong, P., and Zhang, W.D., 2005, “Top 100 entrepreneurs and top 100 capitalists in 
entrepreneurial listed ﬁrms in 2005”, New Fortune, 8. (in Chinese)
5. Su, Q.L., and Zhu, W., 2003, “Family control and firm value of listed firms”, The 
Economic Research Journal, 8. (in Chinese)
6. Xia, L.J., and Fang, Y.Q., 2005, “Government control, corporate governance 
environment and ﬁrm value: Evidence from the Chinese securities market, The Economic 
Research Journal, 5. (in Chinese)
7. Zhou, Q.Y., Xia, L.J., and Li, M.C., 2003, “Tunneling and the bias in appraising the 
assets of listed ﬁrms, The Statistics Research Journal, 10. (in Chinese)
8. Almeida, H., and D. Wolfenzon, 2006, “A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family 
Business Groups”, The Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. 
9. Anderson, R., A. Mansi, and D. Reeb, 2003, “Founding Family Ownership and the 
Agency Cost of Debt”, Journal of Financial Economics 68: 263-285.
10. Anderson, R., and D. Reeb, 2003, “Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500”, The Journal of Finance 58: 1301-1328.
11. Attig, N., K. Fischer, and Y. Gadhoum, 2003, “On the Determinants, Costs, and 
Benefits of Pyramidal Ownership: Evidence on Expropriation of Minority Interest”, 
Working Paper.
12. Bae, K., J. Kang, and J. Kim, 2002, “Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business 
Groups: Tunneling or Value Added?”, The Journal of Finance 57: 2695-2740.
13. Barca, F., and M, Becht, 2001, The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
14. Bertrand, M., M. Johnson, K. Samphantharak, and A. Schoar, 2005, “Mixing Family 
With Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families Behind Them”, 
Working Paper. 
15. Bertrand, M., P. Mehta, and S. Mullainathan, 2002, “Ferreting out Tunneling: An 
Application to Indian Business Groups”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 121-
148.
16. Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan, 2003, “Pyramids”, Journal of the European Economic 
Association 1: 478-483.
17. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang, 2002, “Disentangling the Incentive and 
Entrenchment Eﬀects of Large Shareholdings”, The Journal of Finance 57: 2741-2771.
18. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. Lang, 2000, “The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in East Asian Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81–112.
19.Faccio, M., and L. Lang, 2002, “The Ultimate Ownership of Western European 
Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics 65: 365-395.
20. Fan, J., T.J. Wong, and T. Zhang, 2005, “The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in 
China”, Working Paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and City University of 
Hong Kong.
21. Jiang, G., Charles Lee, and H. Yue, 2006, “Tunneling in China: The Surprisingly 
Pervasive Use of Corporate Loans to Extract Funds from Chinese Listed Companies”, 
Working Paper.
22. Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 2000, “Tunneling”, 
American Economic Review 90, 22-27.
23. Khanna, T., 2000, “Business Groups and Social Welfare in Emerging Markets: Existing 
Evidence and Unanswered Questions”, European Economic Review 44: 748-761.
FOUNDER CONTROL, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM VALUE:  
EVIDENCE FROM ENTREPRENEURIAL LISTED FIRMS IN CHINA 49
24. Khanna, T., and K. Palepu, 2000, “Is Group Aﬃliation Proﬁtable in Emerging Markets? 
An Analysis of Diversiﬁed Indian Business Groups”, The Journal of Finance 55: 867-893.
25. Khanna, T., and J. Rivkin, 2001, “Estimating the Performance Effects of Business 
Groups in Emerging Markets”, Strategic Management Journal 22: 45-74.
26. La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 1999, “Corporate Ownership around 
the World”, The Journal of Finance 54: 471-517.
27. Lemmon, M., and K. Lins, 2003, “Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis”, The Journal of Finance 58: 
1445-1468.
28. Lins, K., 2003, “Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets”, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 159-184.
29. Morck, R., D. Stangeland, and B. Yeung, 2000, “Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, 
and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease”, In R. Morck ed., Concentrated Corporate 
Ownership, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Volume, University of 
Chicago Press.
30. Morck, R., D. Wolfenzon, and B. Yeung, 2005, “Corporate Governance, Economic 
Entrenchment and Growth”, Journal of Economic Literature 43: 657-722.  
31. Villalonga, B., and R. Amit, 2006, “How do Family Ownership, Management and 
Control Aﬀect Firm Value?” Journal of Financial Economics 80: 385 -417.
